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PORTUGAL-ONE OF THE LAST NEUTRALS
By K. H. ABSHAGEN
We aU read 60 much abouI 1M ~igmmU I1Ial _ Me apl to Jorgtst I1Ial a1amJ
Me lIIill _ MlIIml counlriu kft. In an earlMr arlieU _ defiMd netltralily ae
being "1M ability oj a country to chooH one oj thru ~itiu-lo8ttJy out oj the
_, to join one ftde, or to join 1M otMr."
It may be mere chance or it may haw a~ rignificance that, mn<mg 1M
-U group oj nati0n.9 which can lItiU claim to be in thil po6ition, thru oj 1M maIIt
important are oj Iberian IItock-Portugal, Argentina, and Ohile.
. TM afJ4lnJge ~lIon thinkll of Portugal (JI/ a MMll country at 1M utreme
~ end oj Europe, Jorgetting that. in addition, Portugal poiIIIeIIIIU a colonial
empire twenty-liw timell her 1Iiu, the remnant oj hM gloriotu paIIt and,Jor her citiUflll,
wry much a thing oj the pruent.
It Ul't4i1lly rcquirell utra.ordinary llkill to IItur the Portuguue IIhip oj lltate
IArough the many rocks of European and world politiC8 and to preserve Portugal'lI
MUIrality in thTeII yeaTII of world collfiid. It tI)(JI/ accomplillhed by o,,~ of the
outIIfanding men of our time, Dr. Salazar. The author oj the foUowing article ill
-U~ to OUT readerll by hill articlu "Society Diu Hard" (December 19//)
oM "TM RODCl to 1M War oj Greater Eallt AIIia" (January 1942). He "Pent
-w V-- ae Q CCIf"TUPOndent in Porlugal and iI now in ToTcyo.-K.M.
~.
A. KA1f ,AT WORK
SOME time last year a foreign dip-lomat, who had only recently
arrived in Lisbon, had some
urgent business to discuss with the
Portuguese Foreign Office. The time
of day was ten in the morning, so he
got on to the Ministry by telephone.
However, when he asked for the officials
of the department concerned, one after
the other, the young lady at the telephone
invariably answered that the man in
question was not at the office or not in
his room. At last, after a lengthy con-
versation, she told him that, with the
exception of herself, some doormen, char-
women, and other underlings, there was
practically no one---<lertainly no one of
authority-in the Ministry at such an
unearthly hour. Work would not begin
in earnest until later in the day.
No, there was no one present in
the mornings, "except, of course, His
Excellency the Foreign Minister," who
would normally be in at nine o'clock
sharp, "but he does not want to be dis-
turbed by being called on the phone.
You see, he is working."
The lonely Foreign Minister who works
every morning all by himself in the
stately Ministry near the Tagus is no
less a person than Dr. Antonio de Oliveira
Salazar, at the same time Prime Minister,
Minister of War, and-till not so very
long ago--also Minister of Finance. It
was in the latter capacity that he first
became known and laid the foundation
for his international reputation as a
statesman of energy and resource. One
can easily understand that a man of so
many responsibilities cannot afford the
leisurely methods of work which tradition
and climate have made the normal thing
in the Iberian peninsula.
But there is a much deeper significance
in the vision of Dr. Salazar, all alone, day
after day, reading reports, drafting notes,
and making decisions on the foreign
policy of his little country and its far-
Hung colonial empire. As a matter of
fact, well-informed people in Lisbon say
that the reports of Portugal's ambassa-
dors and envoys abroad are opened per-
sonally and perused exclusively by Dr.
Salazar, and that only excerpts written
by the Foreign Minister in his own hand-
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writing go to the UnderseCretary of State
and the departments, while the originals
are kept in the Minister's ~e. That
story may be true, or it may be just a
story, but the significant thing i8 that in
serious quarters in Lisbon it i8 credited
or, at least, not thought at all unlikely.
So it i8 clear that the foreign policy of
Portugal is directed by one man and one
man only.
WHAT 18 THE "ESTADO NOVO"?
This foreign policy can only be under-
stood and appreciated when Been against
the political background and the per-
sonality of the man who governs Portugal
today. The present regime in Portugal
i8 usually rather hazily described as some
kind of Fascism, but there are very few
people outside the country who have a
clear picture of the actual state of affairs
prevailing there. Undoubtedly there are
very definite affinities between the
"E8ttJdoNovo" in Portugal,as the Carmona-
Salazar rule calls itself, and Italian
Fascism, whose "Corporate State" ideas
have to a certain degree eerved as a
model for the Portuguese constitutional
changes.
However. there are probably as many
diJIerences as there are affinities. To
begin with, when General Carmona, fifteen
years ago, overthrew the old liberalistic
order in Portugal, his regime, though full
of the best intentions, was not funda-
mentally diJIerent from previous military
governments which, through the revolt of
either army or navy, had overthrown their
predecessors, only to be forced out in
tum by some hostile faction of politicians
and generals or admirals.
It was not until Dr. Salazar had been
called in by President Carmona to take
over the Ministry of Finance and with it
the thorny task of putting the Portuguese
publio household in order after genera-
tions of waste and corruption, that the
foundations of the Eatado Novo were
truly laid. And even then, when Dr.
Salazar succeeded beyond expectations in
balancing the budget and re-establishing
Portuguese credit to an extent undreamt
of for generations, it did not cause im-
mediate enthusiasm throughout the ooun-
try. For, naturally, these results could
not be obtained without imposing sacri-
fices and hardships on many, by enforcing
retrenchment, by cutting down graft
where many had been used to living on
graft, by increasing work, and by imping-
ing on tho leisure of a people of leisurely
habits and inclinations. All this was
enforced from above by a strong though
benevolent hand. It was not the result
of a popular movement like National-
Socialism in Germany or Fascism in
Italy. The popular movement 8Upport-
ing the regime did not come till after-
wards, when the constructive efton. and
successes of the Government became clear
to everybody both inside the oountry
and outside.
A PAllADOX 01' A DICTATOB
But even now. after he has long been
not only Prime Minister but the un-
questioned leader of his state and people,
Dr. Salazar does not enjoy a popularity
comparable to the feelings with which
Adolf Hitler or Benito Mussolini have
inspired their followers and their nations
as a whole. Dr. Salazar is not at all
the type of man to inspire any people.
let alone a temperamental Latin nation.
He is a paradox of a dictator. The
great majority of Portuguese have never
seen the man who for more than ten
years has been at the helm of their ship
of state. He rarely speaks in publio
and, if he does, his speeches are devoid
of inspiring oratory. They remind one
much more of the leoturee of the pro-
fessor of economics of Coimbra University
-that is what Salazar was up to the
moment when he was called to take
charge of the State's finance-than of a
tribune's fiery rhetorics. U today Dr.
Salazar's Government is firmly established
in the whole country, this is certainly
not due to demagogy but to sound merit.
For its activities have not only put the
coungy's finance on a sound basis, but
given'internal peace and an efficient and
orderly administration to a country that
for decades had been undermined by
continuous political UIlre6t and warped
by corruption.
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Dr. Antonio de Oliveira Salazar
Of COUl'8e, this reform work could not
be performed without interfering in many
cues with old, established habit.s and
vested intt'l"f:'sts. Therefore the esteem
enjoyed by the Government and it.'! chief
in the overwhelming majority of the
nation has not so much the cbul'llctcr of
overflowing enthusiasm as that of great
respect. :For the nation is keenly uwa.re
of the fact that Dr. Salazar, in pite of
being sometimes a rather hard taskmaster,
is simply indis-
pensable, lIDless
the cOlmtry is to
revert to the eYil
conditions of the
past.
ONE - EYED
OPPOSITION
Still, there arc
forces in the
country which,
for obvious rea-
SOI18, do not feel
too happy about
tho present re-
gime. They are
to be found
mostly among
what is usually
known as the
intelligentsia. To
get a true per-
spective of tlw
importancc of
these peoplc, one
must keep in
mind the fact
that Portugal is a nation with a very
low percentage of literacy. When General
Carmona became President of the
Republic in 1926, the proportion of
illiterate persons over seven years was
e.st.imated at seventy-fivc per cent. As
late as 1940, a leading Li~hon newspaper
gave two thirds of the population as a
likely figure for those who can neither
rend nor write. In tho kingdom of tho
blind the one-eyed man if! king, nlld so
in Portugal a man who could not only
read and write Lut whosc gifts enabled
him even to write a newspaper article
f('1 until the present rf'gime came into
power-entitled to take a leading part:
in the political life of the oOlmtry.
Howe,er, in a regime that has done
away with parhamentn,ry squabbles and
has concentrated on 80ber cOIl8tructive
work there on-nnot be many openings in
leading positions for people whose intel-
lectual abilities consist mainly in the art
of writing critical esemys. To this must
be added the fact that for generatioos
many young Por-
tuguese h a v e
Rpent at least
part of their
university years
in Paris, where
most of them
wcre imbued
with the tenets
of the Frenoh
Icftists. This is
another good
reason why a
large part of the
Portuguese intel-
ligentsia is not
and Dever has
been any too
pleased with Dr.
Salazar's Gov-
ernment.
..\ SAFETY VALVE
The method
by which Dr.
Salazar has
limited the po-
tential d an gel'
represented by a considerable num-
ber of disgruntled politioo-inteLlectuals
shows his keen iIl8ight into the
character of his countrymen. Taking
the substance of power out of their
hands, he left them a good deal
of freedom to air their views in the press
by limiting censorship to the exclusion
of news and views which can be regarded
as immediately dangerou8 to the regime
or to the peace and order of the country.
By leaving latently hostile elements this
opportunity to let off steam and by
t.rusting in their natural disinclination to
take action, violent or otherwise, Dr.
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Salazar succeeded to a remarkable degree
in checking the danger of internal unrest.
He was able to do this with comparative
safety, for the widespread illiteracy of
the people prevented the tirades of the
opposition from influencing the real opin-
ion of the masses of peasant farmers,
fishers, and laborers to any extent.
On the other hand, the leniency with
which censorship is handled in Portugal
explains the discrepancy often to 100
observed between the Portuguese press
and the policy of the Portuguese Govern-
ment. In fact, Dr. Salazar's press policy
has on some occasions even jeopardized
Portugal's foreign relations.
THE PLACE OF THE ClIURClI
One other factor in Portugal's internal
situation should at least be touched
upon before trying to draw a pioture of
Dr. Salazar's foreign policy during the
present world conflict. The great ma-
jority of the Portuguese people are devout
Roman Catholics, and Dr. Salazar him-
self is a loyal son of the Church of Rome.
He graduated from a Jesuit College, and
it was there that he made friends with a
classmate who is today Cardinal Patriarch,
that is to say, the highest dignitary of
the Catholic Church in Portugal. The
relations between the Portuguese Republic
and the Holy See had been impaired by
the anti-Catholic measures of a number
of Portuguese govemments under free-
masonic influence, in particular by the
prohibition of religious orders and th.e
secularization of Church property. After
lengthy negotiations held in complete
secrecy, Dr. Salazar succeeded in con-
cluding a new Concordat with the Holy
See in 1940, by which he did away with
most of the grievances of the Church
against the Portuguese State.
He refrained, however, from revoking
the separation of Church and State
enacted under the revolutionary regime
after the overthrow of the monarchy.
Though he regards the Church as one of
the cornerstones of a sound Portugal,
he does not seem to be willing to allow
an overwhelming clerical influence in the
affairs of state. This attitude may not
be wholly satisfactory from the point of
view of some Catholic zealots, but in
general Dr. Salazar can count on the
support of the Church, which, in Portugal
as well as in Spain, is acutely aware of
the dangers of communism and the
spread of Marxist doctrines.
As far as foreign policy is concerned,
however, one must remember that among
Catholic intellectuals there are influential
circles which, under the influence of
Great War reminiscences, have very def-
inite pro-Allied sympathies and make
full use of the lenient press ceusorship to
express these so blatantly as sometimes
to overstep the line of strict neutrality
proclaimed by the Government.
ON THE FENCE
Such is, roughly, the background
against which must be judged the foreign
policy of Dr. Salazar's Government since
the European war broke out in 1939.
This foreign policy has so far been carried
out with sober realism and restraint.
Portugal's situation was, from the very
beginning of this wa,r, extremely difficult;
and the more the war spread the more
difficult did Portugal's situation become.
Long before the Allies violated Por-
tuguese sovereignty in Timor, Lisbon was
aware of the fact that Great Britain and
the United States were casting covetous
glances on the island possessions of
Portugal in the Atlantic Ocean. The
latest events in Madagascar and else-
where, as well as the propaganda for a
"second front" against Germany, are
scarcely designed to allay such fears.
The preservation of the integrity of
the Portuguese colonial empire is the
main aim of Dr. Salazar's foreign policy
in these troubled times, and this aim best
explains the cautious procedure chosen
by Portugal in her dealings with the
countries at war. Since the beginning of
the war, Portugal has been sitting on the
fence, and it has certainly not always
been a very comfortable seat. There
were strong forces trying to draw Portugal
into the Allied camp, and in 1939 there
were many people in and outside of Por-
tugal who believed that, within a very
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IN SPAIN
It has not been
without influence
on the attitude
taken by Portugal
How different with Francel To many
thousands of educated Portuguese, Paris
has always represented, not only the
peak of human culture, but also the play-
ground of their student days, the source
of education and enlightenment, and the
scene of their youthful-and sometimes
not so youthful-escapades and indiscre-
tions. The alliance with Britain was
mainly a matter of £.s.d., the friendship
for France a strong sentimental bond.
Hence the collapse of France in the
summer of 1940 violently shook the pro-
Allied section in Portugal, although a
considerable part of the intellectuals and
confessed or secret leftists remained nega-
tive, hostile, and lacking in understanding
towards Germany.
On the other side there were, from the
beginning of the war, those who saw the
common interest
between Portugal
and the powers who
are fighting for a
new order in
Europe. Not that
the idea itseH of
this new Europe
caught on very
quickly. Portugal
does not really
turn her face to-
wards the European
continent but looks
across the seas to-
wards her colonies.
But there are very
definite common
interests between
the present regime
in Portugal and the
totalitarian regimes
in Germany and
Italy. This became
patent for the first
time during the
Spanish civil war.
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8DlPA.TJ1IB8 FOR
DAN<m
Theee ~tive pro-
Allied sympathies,
whioh sometimes
found strong . ex-
pression in the Por-
tuguese press, were
centered primarily
on France. Great
Britain is the old
ally, she is a good
oustomer for Por-
tugal's exports of
wine and cork and
canned fish, but
British aloofness
and superiority
have made it im-
possible for the
normal Portuguese
to feel comfortable
inBritish company.
Official politeness
on the British side
oannot overcome
the deep-rooted
suspicion that
basically the Por-
tuguese remains to
the Englishman
just a "dago."
,
few weeks of the outbreak of the war,
Portugal would be in it. There was, of
course, the "Auld Alliance" with Great
Britain dating back to 1372; there was
the more recent memory of Portugal's
participation in the last war-though to
many the experience did not invite rep-
etition; there was, above all, the rec-
ognition of the fact that, as long as
Britain and her Allies dominated the high
seas, Portugal, with her weak military
and naval forces, would not be able to
defend for any length of time her far-
flung colonial possessions, should she be
drawn into the conflict by the opposite
side. Besides this, there were also strong
leanings towards the Western democracies
among the leftist intelligentsia mentioned
~ore as well as among wide Catholio
oircles.
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Since the outbreak of the present war that
in Spain the British and French Govern-
ments supported that side whose victory
oould not have been without far-reaching
consequences on the domestic situation
in Portugal. A Red Spain would in aU
likelihood, either by propaganda and
infiltration or by main force, have over-
thrown the present regime of peace a,nd
created a Bolshevi8t center of unrest at
the southwestern extremity of Europe.
Even many otherwise liberalistic people
in Portugal, who were not particularly
enthusiastic about the Cannona-Salazar
regime, were bitterly opposed to this
policy of the Western powers in Spain.
The Portuguese Govemment officially
maintained neutrality towards the struggle
in Spain; but itB sympathies were
clearly on the side of the forces of the
Caudillo. Moreover, oonsiderable num-
bers of Portuguese volunteers fought
against the Reds in Spain, side by side
with Germans and Italians, thus giving
practical expression to the common in-
terests existing between the present re-
gime in Portugal and· National-Socialism
and Fascism. These common interests
persist to this day. Dr. Salazar knows
full well that a destruction of the totali-
tarian regimes of Gennany and Italy by
the forces of the democratic powers and
their Bolshevist ally would sound the
death knell of his own lifework in Por-
tugal.
IBBBIAN 80LIDAlLlTY
Amid these crosscurrents of 0plDlon
in the country and through the backwash
of the changing tides of the European
conflict, Dr. Salazar has consistently tried
to steer a neutral coune with the ultimate
aim of preserving the integrity of his
country and its colonial posseSBions until
the day when peace should be restored.
It is worth noting that the recent in-
ternal conflict in Spain offered him the
cue which made it possible to avoid the
most immediate danger to Portugal's
neutrality, that is, her alliance with Great
Britain.
It seems that in 1939 the British
Government had to some extent become,
the victim of its own propaganda, which
throughout the Spanish civil war had
aUeged that German and Italian aasist-
ance to General Franco had had. no
other object than to gain military basee
in the rear of France and Great Britain.
Therefore, in 1939 the British Govern-
ment agreed to Dr. Salazar's conoluding
a nentrality pact with Spain, because
that seemed to reduce the imaginary
danger of Spanish intervention on the
side of Gennany. When in June 1940
this pact was strengthened by an ad-
ditional protocol which foresees mutual
support against any threat to the in-
tegrity of either of the contracting parties,
Great Britain, having favored the initial
stages of this policy, could not very well
object to its logical continuation, although
for all practical purposes it invalidated
the Anglo-Portuguese alliance.
The policy of Iberian solidarity, which
fonns the backbone of Dr. Salazar's
efforts to avoid being drawn into the war.
has the additional value, from the Por-
tuguese point of view, of allaying the
fears that the Pan-Iberian tendencies
existing in some quarters of nationalist
Spain might at any moment threaten
Portugal's independence.
As the war lengthened out and ex-
tended its range to the farthest comers
of the world, Dr. Salazar not only con-
tinued but steadily intensified his co-
operation with Spain. His visit to Seville
last February, where he met General
Franco and his Foreign Minister Serrano
Suiier, was the first time he had. left his
own country since he became Prime
Minister.
ALLIBD THREATS AND :mTBB.J'DBNCB
At the beginning of the war the Ger-
man Government gave an assurance that
Germany would respect the integrity of
Portugal proper and her colonies as long
as Portugal remained neutral. It haa
strictly adhered to this promise. In the
Anglo-Saxon camp, on the other hand,
voices were heard from a very early date
onwards which in Lisbon were rightly
understood to menace its overseas po8888-
mons, particularly the Azores and Cape
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Portugal represents ollly 4 per cent of the total empire,
as can be seen from the foHowing table:
845,683
Size in sq. m.
with the European continent. More than
once the Portuguese Government has
chosen to yield rather than to risk open
conflict.
Portuguese Empire .
BIG ARMY FOR SMALL COUNTRY!
This meek attitude in the face of con-
tinuous provocation is explained by re-
sponsible Portuguese quarters with the
military weakness of the country. There
are people in Portugal who believe that
more energetic measures of rearmament
taken in time,
i.e., before
the outbreak
of the war or
even during
its ear I v
stages, would
have enabled
the Govern-
ment more
successfully to
stave off these
threats to the
neutrality and
integrityofthe
Portuguese
empire and
Population the actual in-
1------1------ fringemente of
Portugl11.(incl. Azore~ & Madeira.) 35,490 7.360,000 its neu tral
Cape Verde Islands. . . . . . . . . . . . 1,557 163,000
Portuguese Guinea rights. In the
(incl. Dissago8 Islands)...... 13,944 416,000 summer of
Sio Tome 331 53,000 1940 milita
Principe , ., . . . . .. .. . . .. . . . 46 6,900 ' ry
Angola........................ 487,788 3,545.000 quarters even
Mozambique 297,654 4,995,000 ex pre 8 8 e d
Portuguese India.............. 1,537 600,000 di'
Portugu_ Timor.............. 7,330 463,796 open ssatis-
Macao 6 200,000 faction over
17,802,696 the issue of
Portugal's
military weakness. Dr. Salazar, it is
reported, persuaded his military advisers
that a. small country like Portugal
could never be strong enough successfully
to resist the threats or aggressive
acts of major powers, but that on
the other hand the possession of stronger
armaments might make Portugal too
desirable an ally for one or the other
parties at war and thus render the pres-
ervation of her neutrality even more
difficult than in the existing circum-
stances.
There are
other reasons
as well for
Portugal to
feel aggrieved
against Great
Britain. Toan
ever increasing extent, the British
Government has interfered with
Portugal's legitimate overseas trade
with neutral powers and even with the
internal communications of the Portuguese
empire. Not even the mail between
Portugal and her colonies is spared the
indignity of being censored by Britain.
By refusing navioerts for vital necessities,
Buch as tin plate from the United States
for the Portuguese canning industry,
Britain tried to blackmail Portugal even
to t~e extent of interfering with her trade
Verde Islands. The most outspoken
threats came from the United States,
where not only the press but senators
and even President Roosevelt himself
were responsible for utterances which
Portugal could not but take very seriously.
That she did so, and that she is deter-
mined not to yield to threats without
more than formal resistance, was shown
by the repeated dispatch of reinforcements
to the Azores, the Cape Verde Islands, and
Mozambique. The Government was, how-
ever, taken
unawares by
the invasion
of Timor by
Australi an
and Dutch
troops in De-
cember 1941,
an act by
"friendly"
powers which
must have
been very dis-
appointing to
those circl~s
in Portugal
which had so
far sympa-
thized with
the democra-
cies.
•
•
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COLONIAL EMPIBZ AND nw ORDEB
In the peat, the ties connecting Portugal
with the rest of the European continent-
always excepting Spain-have not been
very close. Since her establishment 88 a
national entity in the twelfth century,
Portugal has felt herself to be more of
an Atlantio than a European nation.
Whoever had an opportunity to see the
National Exhibition held in Lisbon in
1940 to celebrate the eighth centenary of
Portugal's birth must have been struok
by the transoceanic ~nd of the P?~U­
gueee mind expressed m the many exhibits.
The holding of the 1940 exhibition in spite
of the European war seems to have had a
double purpose. On the one hand, it
W88 intended to show the countries at
war that Portugal W88 determined to
preserve her neutrality and felt confident
of being able to do so. On the other,
Dr. Salazar clearly wanted to enhance
the Portuguese people's pride in the great
past of its country and to use this pride
88 an incentive to future national efforts.
Where does Portugal stano regarding a
new European oOOer1 In this, 88 in all
other questions today, it is a matter of
where Dr. Salazar stands. His attempt
to revive the national spirit of Portugal
through the memory of the great days of
her history does not necessarily conflict
with a policy of co-operation with those
European nations whose growing unity of
purpose finds its present expreesion in the
fight against Bolshevist Russia, a fight
which concerns Portugal 88 muoh 88 any
other country. From the later phases of
Portugal's colonial history, and more
particularly from her plight in the present
war, a man of Dr. Salazar's realism and
olear-sightedness must necessarily
have drawn the leeson that a
small country with weak means
of defense cannot, in a period
of the growth of ever bigger
economio and political units,
enjoy the fruits of its colonial
enterprise if left to its own
reeourcee.
It has 'been reported that Dr. Salazar
has a very clear unde1'8tanding of the
necessity of Portugal's active oo-operation
in the new Europe whioh will emerge
from the present war, and that the aim
of his neutrality policy is to enable Por-
tugal to enter the new Europe 88 a full
partner with her colonial aasets un·
impaired. Meanwhile, the development
of the world toward the formation of
great political and economio units haa
made momentous progress.
THK SPEECH OJ' A. EUROPEAN
In his latest spef'ch, broadcast on June
25, 1942, Dr. Salazar gave strong indioa-
tions of his positive attitude towards the
new Europe. We quote some of his most
striking passages:
"The world today is suffering from
materialism, individualism, egoism, and
moral disorders. Only the restoration of
spiritual values will give peace back to
Europe and save her from communism,
the foremost enemy, not only of Europe,
but of the whole world ....
"The worst mistake committed by Brita.in
was her alliance with Soviet RU.88ia, with·
out worrying about the mortal danger
which such an alliance spells for the
world ....
"The inability of the democracies during
the poet.war period to settle the problem
of peace is flagrant. Democracy belongs to
the past and an era of new order has been
born, an era where the synthesis of freedom
and community is pe1'8Onified in all those
who are waging Europe's war against the
unnatural alliance between the reactionary
attitude in the West and the nihilism in
the East."
• • •
Out here in the East, where the memory
of the great deeds of Portuguese
explore1'8 and pionee1'8 is alive,
there is much sympathy for
Portugal in her present diffi·
culties and the hope that she
will overcome them in the end
and take her due place in
the European community of
nations.
